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Shhh... Secret Arbitration in Process: The
Unconstitutionality of Delaware's Chancery
Arbitrations
Matthew R. Koch*
Abstract
During the second half of the twentieth century, arbitration rapidly
emerged as a dominant player in the legal industry. Because arbitration
is arguably more efficient and less costly, it serves as an attractive
alternative to litigation. Accordingly, potential litigants and state courts
are increasingly choosing arbitration over traditional litigation to resolve
legal disputes.
Consistent with this trend, the Delaware State Legislature in 2009
enacted an arbitral mechanism that authorized the Court of Chancery to
Following this initiative,
conduct secret arbitration proceedings.
however, in Delaware Coalition Jbr Open Government v. Strine, the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that these
proceedings constitute the functional equivalent of civil trials.
Reasoning that such secrecy inherently conflicts with the guarantee of
open access surrounding traditional litigation, the court definitively
struck down Delaware's experiment as violative of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
This Comment provides an explanation of the arbitral process,
explores the First Amendment in relation to the right of public access,
and analyzes the opinion set forth in Strine. This Comment then
proposes a statutory solution, offering a middle ground that would
survive First Amendment scrutiny, while permitting Delaware to
continue to offer the Chancery alternative.

* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of
Law, 2014; B.A., University of Delaware, 2011. I would like to thank my family and
friends who supported and encouraged me throughout this process, most especially my
mother and grandparents, without whom I would not be the person I am today.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 2009, the Delaware State Legislature embarked on a
creative journey toward more efficient adjudication of cases within the
state's judicial chambers.' To accomplish this seemingly difficult task,
the General Assembly enacted Delaware Code Section 349,2 a law that
authorized sitting chancellors of the Court of Chancery to hear binding,
private arbitration proceedings. 3 The statute permitted confidential
resolution of commercial and business controversies between two
4

consenting parties in a forum accustomed to resolving such disputes.
The Court of Chancery was the logical forum to serve as the testing
grounds for Delaware's new experiment.

Among other things, it is

nationally recognized as a specialized court that is on the forefront of
resolving commercial, intellectual property, and corporate legal battles.5
The program's launch officially ordained Delaware the trailblazer in the

1. Steven M. Davidoff, The Life and Death of Delaware's Arbitration Experiment,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 31, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://nyti.ms/NGTVzK.
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (Supp. 2012).

3.

Id.

4. Id.
5. See H.B. 49, 145th Leg. (Del. 2009); Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention &
Resolution, Not in Private: Delaware's Chancery Court Arbitration Program Is Struck
Down, 30 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 180, 180 (2012).
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field of state court-sponsored arbitration, making6 it the first state to offer
arbitrations presided over by active state judges.
In crafting the process by which secret arbitrations could take place,
the Legislature sought "to preserve Delaware's pre-eminence in offering
cost-effective options for resolving disputes," particularly those
involving the matters mentioned above.7 To participate in such a
proceeding, the parties needed a preexisting arbitration agreement
designating the Court of Chancery as the arbitral forum, or they could
consensually submit the dispute after it arose. 8 The Legislature also
required at least one of the participants to be a Delaware business entity
that met the State's personal jurisdiction standard. 9 Additionally, if
monetary damages comprised the exclusive relief requested, the amount
in controversy could not fall short of one million dollars. 10
Notwithstanding those requirements, eligibility to enter into Chancery
arbitration was broadly granted to all "business disputes."'I
In practice, Section 349 of the Delaware Code empowered the Court12
to conduct what could potentially amount to high stakes
Chancery
of
arbitration hearings.13 To implement this new arbitral model, Chancery
Court Rules 96, 97, and 98 were adopted to provide a clear and
functional process for those who intended to utilize the Chancery
alternative. 14 The Rules stipulated that to initiate the process, the
demanding party must file a petition for arbitration with the court and
pay a special filing fee.' 5 Further, the Rules required the assistance of
Delaware counsel at the petition stage as a preliminary condition of
participation. 16
Unlike the filing of standard claims destined for courtroom
litigation, the petitions directly at issue were excluded from the public
docketing system.' 7 In other words, the public could not discover the
initiation of Chancery arbitrations absent a mutual agreement between

6. Peg Brickley, Secrecy Puts Judges on Defense in Delaware, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 2012, http://on.wsj.com/xxwZ4A.
7. Del. H.B. 49.
8. tit. 10, § 349(a).
9. Id. § 347(a)(2), (3). Consumers, defined as individuals who purchased or leased
merchandise primarily for personal use, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2731(1) (2005), could
not take advantage of this recourse. tit. 10, § 347(a)(4).
10. tit. 10, § 347(a)(5).
11. Id. § 349(a).
12. See id. § 347(a)(5).
13. See id. § 349.
14. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 96-98.
15. Id. R. 97(a)(1).
16. Id.
17. Id. R. 97(a)(4).
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the parties to the contrary. 18 Confidentiality in the petitions and
supporting documents would be lost, however, if the proceedings became
the subject of appeal. 19 In the case of an appeal, the Court of Chancery
would rescind its jurisdiction and the record would be removed to the
Delaware Supreme Court.2 °
Unlike conventional arbitration, the chancellor reviewing the
petition appointed the arbitrator himself.2 1 In effect, non-chancellors,
such as masters sitting permanently in the court, could serve as
arbitrators. 22 By allowing the chancellor to appoint the arbitrator, the
Legislature sought to offer an arbitration alternative that would be held
before "widely recognized competent business court judges who are
familiar with the law that underlies" the agreement to arbitrate.23
After a petition was filed with the court, the chancellor acting as
arbitrator would conduct a preliminary hearing to anticipate future
scheduling concerns and discuss the particulars of the case. 24 At this
point, the parties would attempt to reach some form of agreement
regarding the scope of discovery, availability of witnesses, and issuance
of subpoenas, among other questions of procedure. 25 As to the
proceeding itself, the Rules required arbitration of the claims to
commence within 90 days of the court's receipt of the petition.2 6 The
Rules further required27 Delaware lawyers to attend the proceedings on
behalf of both parties.
Consistent with traditional arbitration norms, Chancery arbitrators
possessed authority to issue final and binding awards.28 Awards could
include not only monetary damages but also "any remedy or relief that
the Arbitrator deem[ed] just and equitable and within the scope of any

18.

See id.

19. DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(4).
20. Id. No case during the life of the arbitration program was ever appealed to the
Delaware Supreme Court.
21. See id. R. 97(b). It should be pointed out, however, that Rule 96(c) permits the
adoption and/or amendment of the arbitration rules by consent of both parties unless the
additional or altered provision is found inconsistent with Rules 96-98. Id. R. 96(c).
22. See id. R. 96(d)(2).
23. Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law Symposium: Delaware's Closed Door
Arbitration: What the Future Holds for Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect
M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 376 (2013).
24. See DEL. CH. CT.R. 97(d).
25. Id. R. 97(f). However, the parties may have already come to an agreement on
these issues and, as such, these issues would not be the subject for consideration during
the preliminary hearing. See id.
26. Id. R. 97(e).
27. Id. R. 98(a).
28. Id. R. 98(f)(3).
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applicable agreement of the parties. 29 Impliedly, an arbitrator could
impose all measures rightfully within the bounds of their judicial powers
to the extent not foreclosed by the parties' agreement.30
Additionally, at any stage in the proceedings prior to a final
disposition, the Rules permitted the parties to mutually opt out of
arbitration if they reached a settlement with the assistance of the
arbitrator. 31 If the arbitrator rendered an award, it carried with it the
same force and effect as any other judgment or decree entered by the
Court.32 Perhaps most significantly, the presiding arbitrator thereafter
became ineligible to adjudicate any subsequent litigation stemming from
the issues identified in the petition.33
In 2012, the Legislature's experiment was cut short when the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware qualified the hearings as civil
trials lacking requisite public access in violation of the First
Amendment. 34 Specifically, Judge McLaughlin held that the public right
of access to civil trials applied to the Chancery arbitrations, and thus
their confidential nature unquestionably violated this liberty interest. 35
As such, the district court struck down portions of the statute pertaining
to the privacy of the proceedings, as well as aspects of the Chancery
Court Rules implementing the procedural mechanisms for these unique
adjudications.36 Considering the noticeable interest the U.S. Supreme
Court has shown toward arbitration generally, and the abundance of
arbitration-related case law generated by the Court,37 the constitutionality
of state-run arbitrations is likely to attract further attention in the federal
courts.
Part II of this Comment examines arbitration in general, weighing in
on both its positive and negative attributes. Part III discusses the First
Amendment in the context of public access to judicial trials, and is
followed by an explanation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in
Part IV. Thereafter, Part V analyzes Delaware's arbitration law as
applied to the constitutional issue of public access to civil trials. This
Comment concludes by offering an intermediate approach that satisfies

29.

DEL. CH. CT.R. 98(f)(1).

30.
31.

See id.
Id. R. 98(e).

32.
33.

Id. R. 98(0(3).
Id. R. 98(0(4).

34. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503-04 (D. Del.
2012).
35. Id. at 504.
36. Id.
37. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013);
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
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both the need for innovative judicial action and public access to the
Chancery arbitrations.
II.

THE ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE

Arbitration functions as a consensual, alternative mechanism for
dispute resolution that is private in nature, typically informal, and
presumably expedient for the disputing parties. 38 All arbitration must
commence from some form of mutual agreement between the litigants.39
The arbitral clause and submission are the primary avenues for initiating
40
the arbitration process.
Prospectively, the arbitral clause is a contract provision under which
the parties agree to the final resolution of future disputes through
arbitration. 41 Alternatively, submission refers to an arbitration agreement
advancing pre-existing controversies to the arbitral forum. 42 The term
"arbitral forum" broadly encompasses any private venue or institution
the parties choose to administer the arbitration.4 3 Arbitration is thus
viewed as a forum selection mechanism in that the same substantive
rights are available to litigants in both the conventional judicial setting
and arbitration."
Accordingly, the freedom of contract doctrine plays a pivotal role in
U.S. arbitration.45 American law permits arbitration to function in the
manner in which it is designed, allowing parties to formulate arbitration
46
rules that best serve their individual interests. Litigants may shape their
own course, "customizing the process to their needs, eliminating
unsuitable rules and techniques, and providing procedural devices that

THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (6th ed. 2012).
39. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478-79 (1989). As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do
so .... It simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
38.

arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms .... Arbitration

under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free
to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 26.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Prod. Co., 687 F.3d
163, 169-71 (3d Cir. 2012).
44. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985); 1 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1 (West 3d ed. 2003).

45.

CARBONNEAU,

46.

Id.

supra note 38, at 24.
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This flexibility
achieve fairness, finality, and functionality. 4 7
distinguishes arbitration from the traditional adjudicatory setting. a
The Advantages ofArbitration

A.

As an available alternative to what can easily amount to costly and
time-consuming courtroom litigation, arbitration offers the benefits of
privacy, party autonomy, and efficiency in rendering final awards. 4 9 The
relative economic advantage of arbitration is paramount to its appeal,
especially within the commercial realm. 50 More specifically, reducing
litigation-related
complications "results in an economy of time and
money."" 1 Streamlined resolution of business disputes reduces the
procedural delay with which courts often struggle and cuts costs for both
parties. 5 ' Arguably, any reduction in time spent and resources consumed
is a mutual benefit for the parties weighing in favor of arbitration.53
The comparative congeniality of arbitration encourages parties to
refrain from clutching onto adversarial weaponry, thereby allowing the
parties to resume their ordinary business relations without undue strain
from the dispute.54 Commercial entities often find it beneficial to avoid
47.

Id.

THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2 (2d ed.
2007); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration:The "New Litigation", 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 51 (observing that party "[c]hoice is what sets arbitration apart from
litigation").
49. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 1. As a disclaimer to the finality of arbitration
awards, Section 10 of the FAA permits an aggrieved party to file a motion for vacatur in
a federal district court. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). Grounds for
vacatur are specifically enumerated in this section, but awards are typically enforced. See
THOMAS J. BREWER & LAWRENCE R. MILLS, VACATUR OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: A
REAL-WORLD REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW 3-8 (2006), availableat http://bit.ly/lbZjU2f.
The FAA will be discussed at greater length in Part IV, infra.
50. OEHMKE, supra note 44, § 16:7.
51. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 11.
52. Id. ("The reduction of litigious obfuscation results in an economy of time and
money."); see also Maurice Rosenberg, The Literature on Court Delay, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 323, 323 (1965) (noting that court delay "has emerged as a highly visible, concrete,
and urgent problem in the administration of civil justice in this country").
53. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 11. It is appropriate to recognize that this
mutual benefit may not be conferred in all instances. There exists a strong argument that
arbitration is ill-suited for certain disputes, given the particular nature of the claim.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) ("Arbitral procedures, while
well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII."). This view is
most clearly associated with consumer and employment arbitration, where positional
disparities are central to attacks on the efficacy of the arbitral forum. See id. Arbitration
in these settings can be manipulated by the stronger party to serve as a mechanism to
mitigate damages and thwart proper relief. Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration:Is it Just?, 57. STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649-50 (2005).
48.

54.

CARBONNEAU,

supra note 38, at 13.
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gladiatorial tactics, such as undue discovery requests, in making their
case. 55 Further, the procedural flexibility inherent in arbitration
facilitates professionalism. 56 It enables litigants to create less formal
adjudicatory settings and set hearings at their convenience, thus
minimizing the stress on those litigants' relationships during the
disagreement.57 It is precisely this professional tenor of arbitration that
contributes to its "business appeal. 5 8
Litigants also value the privacy that underscores the arbitral
process. 59 Unlike court proceedings, arbitration hearings and records are
confidential. 6 ° Confidentiality is especially attractive to those parties
wishing to maintain a competitive edge in the market by protecting
themselves from any negative publicity that may arise from "airing their
dirty laundry., 61 Moreover, the freedom to structure individualized
dispute resolution confers upon parties the advantage of expert and
experienced adjudicators whom the parties can freely select upon the
basis of their unique skill sets. 62 As such, the choice to arbitrate
facilitates the business-oriented desire to "avoid inexpert judges who
may be prone to impose legalistic solutions upon commercial
problems. 63
The ability to designate professional arbitrators would be
meaningless absent an enforceable award. 64 Critical to U.S. arbitration
65
law is the general principle that awards are final and binding in nature.
Indeed, courts typically construe the statutory grounds for judicial

55. Id.
56. Edna Sussman, Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct.
2009, at 20,20, availableat http://bit.ly/IbZkVY].
57. Id.
58. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 13.
59.

WILLIAM H. HANNAY, 2 LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 70:15 (2013),

availableat Westlaw INTLTRADE.
60. Id.
61. Id. The use of "airing their dirty laundry" is not directly taken from the text of
this source, but is quoted for its application as a colloquial phrase.
62. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) ("[P]arties
forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the
benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes." (quoting StoltNielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). As a caveat to the foregoing statement, parties demanding arbitration
are not always afforded meaningful influence over arbitrator designation. See Sternlight,
supra note 53, at 1649-51. The absence of an influential voice in the process is most
prominent in the consumer context, where the commercial party largely controls who
may serve as arbitrator(s) and structures the selection apparatus. Id.
63. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 12.
64. Id. at 557.
65. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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supervision of arbitrat awards narrowly, 66 and such grounds, in theory,
should exclude any review of the merits. 67 Litigants can thus expect full
resolution of the contested issue. 68 As such, any arbitral award stands on
equal footing with judicial decisions mandating damages. 69 These
professed advantages of arbitration help alleviate already overburdened
court dockets by funneling legal conflicts into a distinct and functional
channel of resolution.7°
B.

The Downside to Arbitration

It must be noted, however, that arbitration is not a universal remedy
resolving all of the judicial system's perceived failures. 71 These failures
include overloaded court dockets resulting in undue delay, judicial
decisions fraught with unique uncertainties, generalist judges unfamiliar
with specialized commercial practices, and costs transcending the
affordability range for the average citizen.72 Concededly, arbitration

66. See, e.g., Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)
("Opening up arbitral awards to myriad legal challenges would eventually reduce arbitral
proceedings to the status of preliminary hearings.").
67. See 9 U.S.C. § 10. The limited statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award under Section 10(a) include: (1) corruption, fraud, or undue means in the
procedure; (2) evident partiality in the arbitrators; (3) denial of due process through an
arbitrator's misconduct; and (4) an arbitrator exceeding the scope of his or her authority
under the arbitration agreement. Id. § 10(a). Notwithstanding these limited grounds,
some courts have vacated arbitral awards under non-statutory grounds. See, e.g.,
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). In Improv
West, the Ninth Circuit held that "manifest disregard of the law," a non-statutory ground
for vacatur, remained valid under § 10(a)(4). Id. at 1281. The court explained that an
arbitrator manifestly disregards the law when he or she recognizes the applicable law and
simply ignores it. Id. at 1290. It has been recognized, however, that such a common law
ground has the potential to expose arbitration awards to merits review. Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). The U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to definitively address the issue of whether manifest disregard as a nonstatutory ground for judicial supervision has been subsumed into the enumerated
standards in Section 10(a). Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585
(2008).
68. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 22.
69.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

70.

CARBONNEAU,

§

84 (1982).

supra note 38, at 22.

71. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 665
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's repeated incantation of the high ideals of
'international arbitration' [improperly] creates the impression that this case involves the
fate of an institution designed to implement a formula for world peace.").
72. See Jose Cabranes, Arbitration and U.S. Courts: Balancing Their Strengths,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1998, at 22, 23; Andrew Pincus, The Advantages ofArbitration, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 24, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://nyti.ms/KkVeVv ("In fact, ordinary
people cannot access the courts, with their byzantine rules and time-consuming delays
). Depending
.....
on the arbitral process constructed, however, arbitration may actually
serve as a more expensive substitute for litigation in some cases. See Green Tree Fin.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:2

embodies certain drawbacks that make it vulnerable to criticism. 73 For
instance, critics readily emphasize arbitration's ad hoc character,
stressing its purported failure to adequately protect parties' rights and
interests, including those of non-signatories. 74 Furthermore, the same
desired element of privacy critical to commercial entities is detrimental
to particular public interests, specifically access to otherwise public

information. 75 Public scrutiny, which provides an informal check upon
Instead, arbitration
the judicial system, is simply nonexistent.76
embraces self-governance, restrained largely by market forces. 77
Compounding the privacy dilemma, arbitral awards provide a barebones resolution of the case. 78 Rather than disclosing the legal rationale
and publicizing a written opinion, arbitrators usually finalize the dispute
with a mere one-page statement of the ultimate award. 79 This, in turn,
negates any real possibility for precedential value and hampers
predictability in the future outcomes of similarly arbitrated
controversies. 8
As a consequence, trust in the arbitrator's
professionalism and legal competence in applying the relevant law is
essential. 81

Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000). Accordingly, it is incorrect to assert that
arbitration is a universal solution to the potential cost deterrents of litigation. Id.
73. See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT

17-23 (2006).

74. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (holding that the
arbitral forum is inappropriate for the protection of statutory rights created under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
75. Brian JM Quinn, Skyworks Fireworks, M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://bit.ly/vTEu6I. A non-signatory is a party that has not signed the arbitration
contract. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995).

76.

BRUNET ET AL.,

supra note 73, at 10.

77. CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 14.
78. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 73, at 10.
79. Id. There is a qualified exception to this generalized statement if the arbitration
rules adopted require publication or the parties' consent to such action. 3 OEHMKE, supra
note 44, § 117:5.60 (Supp. 2011). Still, there is no supreme mandate dictating that an
arbitrator follow a previous award or any supporting rationale provided. See Eljer Mfg.,
Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1994).
80. See, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 490
(2011) (observing that arbitrators "can flout controlling law" as they are not bound by
precedent). Maritime arbitration exemplifies this concept. Arbitrators in that field can
consult and use previous awards as persuasive authority, but they are under no obligation
to adhere to such precedent and thus are not bound in their decision-making.
CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 388. On the other hand, international arbitral awards,
within the context of "a-national arbitration," can function as legal precedent. See id. at

39.
81.

CARBONNEAU,

supra note 38, at 14.
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Subject Matter Inarbitrabililty,or the Lack Thereof

The U.S. Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence has noted that
certain private disputes implicate the public interest to such a degree that
any recourse other than through the court system is against public policy
and therefore intolerable. 82 The Court in recent years has shifted gears,
however, praising arbitration for its ability to protect substantive rights to
the same extent as the judiciary. 83 The need for non-judicial resolution
of statutory claims is clearly reflected in the contemporary judicial
attitude that "objections centered [solely] on the nature of arbitration do
84
not offer a credible basis for discrediting the choice of that forum."
Unless it can be established that "Congress itself has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights[,]" the
particular subject matter alone is not an absolute barrier to the arbitral
forum. 85 The tension between the desire for efficient dispute resolution
and society's understandable interest in statutory rights must be analyzed
in conjunction with the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.8 6
Simply put, unless a clear congressional indication to the contrary exists,
the presumption remains in favor of arbitration. 7
D.

Court of Chancery: A Quick Profile

The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely recognized as one of the
nation's premier business adjudication venues. 8 Its national prominence
is largely due to its specialization in corporate law, created by the high
volume 89 of corporate litigation that it confronts. 90 Chancellors, as such,
82. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (finding that an
agreement to arbitrate certain labor disputes does not foreclose a litigant's right to
vindicate his or her Title VII statutory rights in court); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953) (finding claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 inarbitrable), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
83. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 268 (2009) (explaining that
arbitration is "readily capable of handling" disputes involving statutory rights (quoting
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
84. Id. at 269. But see In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.
2012), rev'd sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest,, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-FederalJoint Venture of ProvidingJustice, 48 Bus. LAW. 351, 354
(1992).
89. Id. An overwhelming number of companies choose to incorporate in Delaware,
largely because of its business-friendly corporate stance.
See Faith Stevelman,
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have vast experience with the intricacies that underlie commercial
transactions. 91 Decisions are rendered quickly with the advantage of
Delaware decisional law that has been progressively refined by the
jurisdiction's extensive exposure to business controversies. 92 Simply
put, the court's unique competence in, and exposure to, issues of
corporate law is unmatched. 93
The court itself is composed of five chancellors:
four vice
chancellors and one chancellor. 94 Corporations flock to Delaware
precisely because of the value the court's detailed opinions hold,
95
opinions which also eliminate the unpredictability of jury trials.
Businesses are therefore guaranteed a "level playing field" and are
privileged with an aptly qualified judge. 96 As one commentator stated,
"[the history and tradition of the Court of Chancery and the human
capital of its excellent judges, cannot be magically transplanted to some
other jurisdiction. 97
The court's reputation for innovative legal
solutions to complex transactional problems only enhances its appeal as
an adjudicative forum. 98 It should come as no surprise that the court's
expertise in corporate matters offers a powerful reason for Fortune 500
99
companies to incorporate in Delaware.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE FIRST AMENDMENT & THE QUALIFIED
RIGHT TO ATTEND TRIAL

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant
part, "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,

Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in CorporateLaw, 34

DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59-60 (2009). There is also no residency requirement and its filing
fee is relatively cheap compared to other states. See CLIFFORD R. ENNIco, 7 WEST'S
McKNNEY'S FORMs BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 1:28 (2012). Further, as explained
above, Delaware has a separate, specialized court system for corporate law that does not
involve juries. Id. Accordingly, most corporate litigation finds its way to the Court of
Chancery, as both commercial parties are probably incorporated in Delaware. See id.
90. Rehnquist, supra note 88, at 354.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307 (1999).
95. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS
CHOOSE DELAWARE 5 (2007), available at http://l.usa.gov/HAgIRP.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. See William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 570, 587.
99. See BLACK, supra note 95, at 7; see also Fortune 500, CNN MONEY (May 21,
2012), http://cnnmon.ie/KHiSJB. Approximately 61 percent of Fortune 500 companies
are chartered in Delaware. Steele, supra note 23, at 376.
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or of the press." 100 Application of this substantive mandate extends to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 01 Not until 1980, when
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,'i 2 did the Court determine that the First Amendment extends to
the public the right to observe and attend criminal prosecutions.' 3 The
following section will discuss and analyze Richmond Newspapers, along
with precedential case law stemming from the Third Circuit.
A.

Richmond Newspapers-The Forerunner

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, John Paul Stevenson,i04
accused of stabbing a hotel manager to death, was indicted for murder. 0' 5
The case was tried a total of four times.' 0 6 The Virginia Supreme Court
reversed the initial conviction for improper admission of material
evidence-namely, a bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to
Stevenson. 0' 7 The second and third attempts resulted in mistrials. 108 On
the fourth try, counsel for the defendant requested that the trial court
close the proceedings to the public as a preventive measure against
further procedural mishaps. 10 9 The trial judge ultimately granted the
motion, but the decision did not remain unchallenged." i0 Among those
against granting closure were reporters for Richmond Newspapers.''
The reporters challenged the ruling, arguing that the public had a right of
access to the proceedings."12 Nonetheless, appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court was denied. 113 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the constitutionality of the trial court's order. 114

100.
101.
102.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

103. Id. at 580.
104. DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SINCE 1807, at 160 (1994).
105. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The second trial ended in a mistrial after a juror requested to be excused in
the midst of the proceedings and no replacement was available. Id. The third trial also
concluded in a mistrial, but on the ground that a prospective juror had read about the
previous judicial blunders in the news and thereafter informed the other prospective
"jurors about the case before the retrial began." Id.
109. Id. at 559-60.
110. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560-61.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 562 n.4.
113. Id. at 562.
114. Id. at 562-63.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that implicit in the First Amendment
is the right for the public and press to attend criminal trials." 5 Absent a
compelling interest supported by a strong factual basis, criminal cases
must remain open to the public.116 Although no categorical demand
exists within the text of the First Amendment itself, the Court reasoned
that inaccessible criminal trials would foreclose significant aspects of
free speech and press. 117 Moreover, the ability to attend such
proceedings provides substance to the explicit guarantee of free8
communication by facilitating the dissemination of public information. "
On this issue of first impression, the U.S. Supreme Court diligently
examined the historical background surrounding the openness of criminal
trials. "9
The Court's analysis concluded that an "unbroken,
uncontradicted history" compelled a presumption of openness inherent
120
"in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."'
After citing numerous legal scholars and colonial history, 121 the Court
endorsed the view that open judicial forums give the assurance of fair
proceedings, discourage perjury in the face 22
of public reaction, and deter
secret bias or partiality on behalf of judges. 1
Deriving its authority from this analysis, a two-pronged test
emerged for determining when a First Amendment right of access
24
exists. 123 The two prongs focus exclusively on experience and logic. 1
The experience prong addresses whether the challenged proceedings
have historically remained open, whereas the logic prong emphasizes
whether the
societal benefit of public access outweighs competing
25
concerns. 1

115. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. However, the U.S. Supreme Court later
noted that the right of access is qualified, not absolute. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enter.I1), 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
116. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
117. Id. at580.
118. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119.

Id. at 564-73 (majority opinion).

120.
121.

Id. at 573.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 566-69 (citing THOMAS SMITH, DE

REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 101 (Alston ed. 1972); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF
THE COMMON LAW 31-32 (1904); ARTHUR SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA
128-29 (1930); 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
129 (1971); 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 101, 105
(1904); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343-45 (6th
ed. 1820); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73).

Id. at 569.
The U.S. Supreme Court later clarified this test. See Press-Enter.II, 478 U.S. 1,
9 (1986); Press-Enter. Co v. Superior Court (Press-Enter.1), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe
122.
123.

Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

124.
125.

Press-Enter.1I,478 U.S. at 8-9.
Id.
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Significantly, the Court recognized that its opinion was not
controlling on the issue of civil trials.1 26 It nonetheless stated that "both
civil and criminal hearings have been presumptively open."' 127 The Court
also suggested that due process requires public access regardless of the
nature of the case.' 2 8 No U.S. Supreme Court case following Richmond
Newspapers, however, has directly ruled on the right to attend civil trials,
although every Court of Appeals to consider the issue, including the
held that there exists a qualified right of access to
Third Circuit,129 has
30
such proceedings. 1
B.

Publicker Industries-Picking Up the Slack

In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,' 3 1 the Third Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression: whether the First Amendment
32
secures for the public and press a right of access to civil proceedings.1
After a fairly short opinion, the panel held in the affirmative. 133 Utilizing
the rubric laid out in Richmond Newspapers, the court found that a34right
of access to civil trials and records is historically well-established. 1
Quoting numerous early English and American legal scholars, as
the U.S. Supreme Court did in Richmond Newspapers, the Third Circuit
concluded that experience dictated a presumption of openness in civil as
well as criminal hearings. 3 3 The court found the same logic supporting
public criminal trials-namely, maintaining confidence in the judicial
system-to be equally applicable in the civil setting.' 36 Under Third
Circuit precedent, strict scrutiny applies where access to any type of
judicial trial is denied; that is, absent a compelling governmental interest
and no less restrictive means of remedying that concern, courts may not
126. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 574 (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960)).
129. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984). The
finding of this qualified right by the Third Circuit carries significant weight given the fact
that this circuit includes Delaware. As such, the Delaware District Court is bound by the
Third Circuit's conclusion of law.
130. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988);
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker,
733 F.2d at 1061; In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309 (7th Cir. 1984); In re
Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 1061.
133. Id. at 1070.
134. Id. at 1066-67.
135. ld. at 1068-69; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 (1979)
(acknowledging historical evidence indicates that the constitutional right to request a
public criminal trial carries over into the civil realm).
136. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070.
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restrict otherwise unconstrained admission to civil trials.137
This
analysis, nonetheless, did not address arbitration, and certainly did not
account for the tremendous force behind the Federal Arbitration Act.
IV. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act' 38 ("FAA" or "the
Act") served as a congressional mandate to legitimize arbitration in the
United States. 139 The FAA's express purpose was to eliminate
longstanding judicial hostility toward .the arbitral forum and place
40
arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contractual provisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court has effectively sponsored arbitration's growth
and has provided for its judicial protection, resolving all doubts of the
Act's scope in favor thereof.14' Statutory civil rights, 142 adhesive
consumer agreements prohibiting class actions, 143 and even mandatory
employment contracts 144 have all been implicitly or explicitly deemed
arbitrable by the U.S. Supreme Court under the auspices of the FAA.
Over time, the Court crafted a national policy
on arbitration and
45
federalized arbitration law as practiced today. 1
The strategic dynamics underlying the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisional law have driven doctrinal change in domestic arbitration that
has transformed this dispute mechanism into a "phenomenon that
pervades the contemporary economy."'' 46 The Court's expansive
interpretations of the FAA have arguably created a federal right to
arbitrate.

147

In Southland v. Keating,148 the Court struck down as

137. Id. The Third Circuit goes on to discuss the procedural and substantive
requirements that must be met for closure. Id. at 1071-75. However, because the
Delaware secret arbitrations were deemed "civil trials," the remainder of the opinion is
irrelevant for purposes of this comment. See id.
138. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
139. Id. § 2 (stating agreements to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable").
140. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1991)).
141. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
142. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement ....
").
143. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
144. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001).
145. Id. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of FederalArbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1420 (2008).
147. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that a provision
of California law directly conflicted with the FAA and thus violated the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution).
148. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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unconstitutional statutory enactments and judicial decisions diverging
from the FAA's congressional purpose.149 As the intended solution to
protracted litigation, arbitration has unquestionably been nurtured by the
Court into something beyond the contractual status the FAA sought to
bestow upon it.' 50 Notwithstanding a few decisional outliers, 5 ' the U.S
Supreme Court has consistently endorsed all interpretative measures
within its constitutional power to foster arbitral recourse, even in the face
of adverse public policy considerations. 152
The U.S. Supreme Court has long read the FAA as a substantiverather than merely procedural-federal statute that preempts inconsistent
state law. 153 As the centerpiece of the statute, Section 2 provides that "an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 154 This provision has
opened the door for a great deal of latitude in interpreting the validity of
arbitral contracts. 155

The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the limited circumstances
under which the FAA will invalidate an arbitration agreement., 56 Such
judicial approval of arbitration underscores the significance of the
bargain for that recourse. 157 The freedom to contract overshadows
legitimate societal concerns, a problem only magnified when
proceedings are resolved in a private setting. 158 However, unless
149. Id. at 16.
150. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 673-75 (2010);
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Pearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).

152. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987).
153. See, e.g.,AT&TMobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1756 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
155. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[I]nequality in bargaining power, alone, is not a valid basis upon which to invalidate an
arbitration agreement." (citing Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 229 (3d
Cir. 1997))).
156. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987)
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)).
157. Id. The Court emphasizes that the proper judicial approach is to refuse a merits
review, as both parties contractually agreed to submit all legal and factual interpretation
to the arbitrator(s). Id. at 37-38.
158. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers Local 701, 696
N.E.2d 658, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding an arbitrator's reinstatement of a school
bus mechanic after discharge for cocaine use violated public policy to suppress illegal
drug use among transportation employees); see also Westvaco Corp. v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 978 (4th Cir. 1999) (reinstating a serial sexual
harasser because the parties bargained for the judgment of an arbitrator and not a court).
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violative of explicit and well-settled public policy detailed by federal
statutory and decisional law, as opposed to generic public policy
considerations, arbitration will be upheld. 159 Any other view would
create discernible tension with the clear federal policy to defend
arbitration against amorphous attacks.1 60 In this regard, providing for
arbitral autonomy adds substance to Section 2 of the FAA. 161
Section 5 of the FAA 162 gives the freedom of contract doctrine
additional recognition. It expressly delegates to the arbitrating parties
the ability to control the selection of arbitrators.163 This power is
essential not only to customize the arbitral process to the parties'
individual interests, but also to ensure the award's enforceability-the
purpose of entering into arbitration in the first place. 164 Under
Section 10(a)(2), the FAA requires only that the selected arbitrators be
impartial to the proceeding.' 65 This section implies that the parties can
designate as arbitrators whomever they wish, contingent only on
satisfying procedural due process.1 66 If partiality is challenged, the
responding party satisfies its burden upon a showing that the arbitrator is
not infected with bias. 167 In general, parties often find it expedient to

159. Misco, 484 U.S. at 42 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983)); see also Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782
(11 th Cir. 1993) (noting that the action must directly conflict with unequivocal public
policy), abrogatedon other grounds as recognized in Frazier v. CitiFin. Corp., 604 F.3d
1313 (11 th Cir. 2010).
160. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 36 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 588 (2008) ("Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and
evidentiary appeals that can 'rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process' . . . ." (alteration in original)
(quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir.
2003))).
161. Waterbury Bd. of Educ. v. Waterbury Teachers Ass'n, 357 A.2d 466, 471 (Conn.
1975) ("The continued autonomy of that process [arbitration] can be maintained only
with a minimum ofjudicial intrusion.").
162. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
163. Id. ("If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators. . . such method shall be followed .... ").
164. Francis 0. Spalding, Selecting the Arbitrator: What Counsel Can Do, in
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 181, 181 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette
A. Jaeggi eds., 2006).
165. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 590 (2008). But see Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617,
620 (7th Cir. 2002).
166. See Hayne, Miller & Fami, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (E.D. Wis.
1995) ("A fundamentally fair hearing 'requires only notice, opportunity to be heard and
to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decision makers, and
that the decision makers are not infected with bias."' (emphasis added) (quoting Bowles
Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994))).
167. See id. (quoting Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1013).
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select retired68 judges for their perceived prudence, experience, and
impartiality. 1
The U.S. Supreme Court has effectively federalized arbitration law
through its interpretation and application of the FAA.16 9 Accordingly,
the FAA was the applicable substantive law surrounding the Chancery
arbitrations.17 0 As discussed in the following section, however, such
proceedings must first properly constitute "arbitrations" for the Act to
control. 171
V.

ANALYSIS OF DELAWARE'S

LAW: SHAM TRIALS OR ACTUAL

ARBITRATIONS?

The constitutional issue raised in Delaware Coalition for Open
Government v. Strine172 appears to represent a clash between two legal
titans: 173 the federal right to arbitrate and the constitutional guarantee of
free speech. 174 Not surprisingly, the case boiled down to how the district
court weighed the various policy considerations surrounding these two
titans. 17 The district court ultimately determined that the arbitrations
were effectively civil trials that necessitated openness-a requirement in

168. See Curtis E. von Kann, A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial
Arbitration:Assessing and Improving Delivery of the Benefits Customers Seek, 7 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 499, 511 (2009).
169. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c) (Supp. 2012). "Any application to vacate,
stay, or enforce an order of the Court of Chancery issued in an arbitration proceeding"
must be filed with the Delaware Supreme Court, "which shall exercise its authority in
conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, and such general principles of law and
equity as are not inconsistent with that Act." Id.
171. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (D. Del.
2012).
172. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012).
173. See id. at 497-501. The District Court of Delaware decided this case solely on
First Amendment considerations while neglecting any discussion of the strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration. Id. at 501-04. It is in the respectful opinion of this author
that such concerns are paramount to the issue at hand.
174. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 ("We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the
intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a
right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its
enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted."); see also Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) ("Free speech has occupied an exalted position because
of the high service it has given our society. Its protection is essential to the very
existence of a democracy.").
175. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 499. For example, such considerations include the
importance of public dissemination of information as well as encouraging innovation
within the processes for dispute resolution. Id. at 499, 503. Strine exemplifies the
tension between these two concerns. See id. at 502 (noting that "several courts have
noted the inherent tension between the role ofjudge and arbitrator").
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direct conflict with Delaware's experiment. 71'6
This critical
determination, however, failed to incorporate the experience and logic
test, rendering the district court's analysis flawed.177
A.

Where the DistrictCourt Went Wrong

The vitality of the Chancery arbitration system hinged on whether
the district court characterized the proceedings as secret civil trials. 7 8 In
the district court's eyes, the real question was whether these arbitrations
"'walk, talk, and squawk' . . . like a judicial proceeding." 179 On appeal,
the Third Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that the right of access
attached to the Chancery arbitrations, but reprimanded
the lower court
80
for bypassing the experience and logic test. 1
Couched in terms antagonistic toward private arbitration, the district
court's opinion emphasized the procedural similarities between
arbitration and civil trials.' 8 1 For instance, Judge McLaughlin
specifically noted that rather than the parties determining their own
discovery rules, many of the same rules governing discovery in Chancery
Court litigation applied to Chancery arbitration. 82 Moreover, in finding
that the Chancery arbitrations were like civil trials, Judge McLaughlin
underscored the fact that a sitting judge would preside over the
arbitrations "in the Chancery courthouse with the assistance of Chancery
Court staff."'183 In a similar vein, she noted that the chancellors and staff
who would administer the arbitrations were not privately

176. See id. at 502. "Before this Court can consider the experience and logic test, it
must address this threshold question. Has Delaware implemented a form of commercial
arbitration to which the Court must apply the logic and experience test, or has it created a
procedure 'sufficiently like a trial' such that Publicker Industries governs?" Id. at 500
(citation omitted).
177. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't, Inc. v. Strine, No. 12-3859, 2013 WL 5737309, at *3
(3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013).
178. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
179. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 702 (6th Cir. 2002).
180. Strine, 2013 WL 5737309, at *3. The Third Circuit held that the confidentiality
of Delaware's arbitration program violated the First Amendment's right of public access
because both the place and process of the proceedings have historically been open to the
public and the benefits of public access outweighed its drawbacks. Id. at *10. However,
it is this author's opinion that the Third Circuit wrongly focused on the physical place of
the arbitrations and those who would serve as arbitrators, rather than on the nature of the
proceedings before the Chancery Court, when assessing the experience prong.
181. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 500-03.
182. Id. at 502.
183. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit also highlighted this point.
Strine, 2013 WL 5737309, at *5-7.
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compensated. 8 4 Instead, they would receive their usual salaries for
arbitration work.1 85
While the above-mentioned distinctions are certainly true, both the
district and appellate court have not grasped the essence of arbitration
and the dominant role it plays in U.S. law. 186 In many ways arbitration
hearings resemble civil trials in both function and form, but these
parallels do not necessarily create a quid pro quo. 187 In fact, unlike
claims typically presented in the Court of Chancery, the arbitration
proceedings that follow an initial petition are customizable to the parties'
needs. 88 One would be hard-pressed to argue that standard litigation
invites such procedural flexibility. To the contrary, a repeated criticism
of civil trials is that associated formalities, such as stringent evidentiary
rules, tend to funnel litigants into a "one size fits all" avenue for
adjudicative relief.' 89 This is the type of problem the Delaware State
Legislature attempted to combat.' 90 Such flexibility, which both courts
failed to meaningfully explore, constitutes a significant distinction
between the Chancery arbitrations and traditional civil trials.
The district court also analyzed the arbitrator selection process set
forth in Chancery Court Rule 97(b). 19' The court took issue with the idea
that the chancellor, rather than the parties, would select the Chancery
Court judge who would hear the case. 192 The court's analysis, however,
failed to describe how the parties initially wound up at the Court of
Chancery. Critically, the parties purposely selected that specific forum,
knowing full well the institutional rules that would subsequently
attach. 193 In essence, by selecting the Court of Chancery as the arbitral

184. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
185. Id.
186. Nowhere in the opinion does the court recognize, or at least allude to, the U.S.
Supreme Court's historical support for arbitration or its rhetoric supplying a presumption
in favor of arbitral validity.
187. See Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings:IndistinguishableJustice
or Justice Denied?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 205 ("Arbitration in practice may not
be the procedurally or substantively differentiated process that was originally envisioned.
For instance, arbitrations now frequently include legal counsel for parties, legal briefs,
comprehensive records, and extensive hearings. In these ways, arbitrations mimic the
formalities and lawyers' orchestration of litigation.").
188.

See DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(c).

189. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication
Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1619 (1997)
(maintaining that what we have gleaned from the "field of ADR" is that "one size does
not fit all" and that "different configurations of disputants, issues, and stakes in disputes
may militate in favor of different forms of disputing").
190. See H.B. 49, 145th Leg. (Del. 2009).
191.

DEL. CH. CT.R. 97(b).

192.

Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (D. Del. 2012).

193.

See DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(d)(7).
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forum, the parties indirectly selected who would serve as their arbitrator.
Regardless, it is not an indispensible feature of arbitration for parties to
possess the power to handpick their arbitrator. 194 In fact, the FAA
mandates that if the
parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, a federal court
95
1
one.
appoint
will
Paramount to arbitral efficacy is the parties' mutual agreement to be
bound by the arbitrator's award-a bedrock principle of arbitration that
is antithetical to traditional judicial recourse.' 96 In other words, parties
are not compelled to arbitrate; they are willing participants. 9'
Conversely, unwilling litigants are compelled to participate in civil trials
if they wish to have any say in the matter. 98 It seems logical that such a
sharp distinction would qualify the Chancery proceedings as arbitrations,
yet this did not persuade the district court. 199 At the most basic level,
what separates the Delaware alternative from traditional civil litigation is
the requirement of consent.
This strong distinction, however, is somewhat diluted by practical
concerns over the use of public resources for the Chancery
arbitrations.2 In the words of Judge McLaughlin, "the actions of those
charged with administering justice through the judiciary is always a
public matter.", 20 ' Admittedly, without the use of government employees
and public facilities, the program loses much of its defining temperament
and allure. Nonetheless, placing such a high degree of emphasis on
procedural nuisances unjustifiably stresses form over function. For
instance, corporations in Delaware are already free to choose arbitration
over litigation.20 2
That these companies can arbitrate otherwise
important disputes remains unchanged; the Chancery arbitrations merely
rerouted the path to that destination.20 3
Regardless of the benefits of fostering public access, substituting
Chancery arbitration with its private counterpart would achieve the same
dreaded secrecy rejected in Strine yet nurtured under U.S. Supreme

194. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
195. Id.
196. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989).
197. Id.
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a). This statement must be qualified by the assumption
that the particular dispute is not decided on the pleadings.
199. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502-03 (D. Del.

2012).
200. Id. at 503.
201. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
202. Brickley, supra note 6 ("Corporations already can choose arbitration over
litigation, says Lawrence Hamermesh, who represents the Chancery judges.").
203. See id.
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Court precedent. 2°4 By eviscerating Delaware's experiment, the court
took arbitral power out of the hands of a select few experts accustomed
to public accountability and indirectly placed that same authority in the
hands of private institutions. The irony of the district court and Third
Circuit decisions is that less, not more, accountability is safeguarded.
B.

Application of the Experience and Logic Test

As the foregoing indicates, classifying these procedures is not the
straightforward inquiry it appears at first blush. The fusion of judicial
resources with fundamental principles of arbitration created a legal
mechanism unprecedented in U.S. arbitration law.2 °5 From this angle,
application of the Richmond Newspapers experience and logic test leaves
substantial room for interpretive maneuvering.20 6 Consistent with the
insight into arbitration and Chancery proceedings detailed above, the
Delaware alternative does not quite mimic the proverbial quack of
ordinary civil trials.20 7 Accordingly, the depth of the Richmond
Newspapers analysis would be shallow without peering into the
etwl
will
As such, this Comment
historical openness of arbitration cases. 208thsCm
now independently apply the experience and logic test to the Chancery
arbitrations.
I.

Application of the Experience Prong

Not surprisingly, the history of arbitration is devoid of public
participation. 20 9 Rather, arbitration evinces a historical tradition of
confidentiality. 210
This historic experience lends support to the

204. See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
205. See Brickley, supra note 6.
206. See Tom Hals, Backers of Secret Delaware Arbitrations See Grounds for
Appeal, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2012, available at http://bit.ly/HJIvyK (accessible with

Westlaw account).
207.
208.

See DEL. CH. CT. R. 96-98.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-74 (1980)

(exploring in great detail the historical openness of criminal trials).
209.

CARBONNEAU, supra note 38, at 11 ("Arbitral proceedings are not open to the

public and awards generally are not published.").
210. Id. The procedural rules of both national and international arbitral institutions
reflect the central role confidentiality occupies. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
G.A. Res. 65/22, at art. 28(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/465 (Dec. 6, 2010) ("Hearings shall
be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise."); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 26(3) (2012) ("Save with the approval of the arbitral tribunal

and the parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted."); AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-23

(2009) (arbitrators must "maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to
the contrary"); CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon
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conclusion that arbitration proceedings have never been presumptively
open. Thus, application of the Richmond Newspapers experience prong
weighs heavily in favor of upholding the validity of the Chancery
arbitrations.
2.

Application of the Logic Prong

Although the argument for open access presumably fails under the
first part of the Richmond Newspapers test, 21 1 there are abundant policy

reasons for upholding public access to adjudicative hearings involving
major corporations. 1 2 Among the practical policy objectives concerned
is the adequate maintenance of Delaware corporate law-a body of law
developed primarily by well-reasoned, detailed, and published Chancery
opinions.21 3 Without the benefit of published memoranda, there exists
the potential for Delaware corporate law to begin "developing in the
dark., 214 Undercutting the predictability and stability within the very
law that attracts businesses to incorporate in Delaware might therefore
create a long-term effect neither envisioned nor desired by the
Legislature.21 5 Private development of that body of law, obscured by the
arbitral veil, could very well negatively impact Delaware's critical
business appeal.
Further consideration of the logic prong fails to placate concerns
that Delaware's scheme will inevitably create a two-tiered judicial
system. 21 6 As the Third Circuit previously recognized, promoting public
VI(B) (2004) ("The arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the
arbitration proceedings and decision.").
211. This result follows only if the proceedings are characterized by the tradition of
confidentiality narrowly surrounding arbitrations. The Third Circuit took a broader
approach and explored the history of the type of proceedings under review (i.e., its
historical analysis was not limited specifically to arbitration). Del. Coal. for Open Gov't
v. Strine, Inc., No. 12-3859, 2013 WL 5737309, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013).
Accordingly, it found that the experience prong mandated public access to Delaware's
arbitration program. Id. at *7.
212. See Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 7-20, Strine, No. 12-3859, 2013 WL 175552, at
*8-20.
213. Brickley, supra note 6 (what Delaware has to offer corporations is "a body of
business law that has been forged in public view and is refined and certain"); see BLACK,
supra note 95, at 5.
214. Brickley, supra note 6.
215. See id. Less predictability within the confines of corporate law ultimately
creates unwanted problems for transactional planning. Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor
Allen's Jurisprudenceand the Theory of CorporateLaw, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 688
(1992) (explaining the "necessity that corporate law provide a sufficient level of stability
and predictability to allow corporate planners to have a high level of confidence as to the
law that courts will apply to their transactions").
216. See Joe Palazzolo, A Judge and an Arbitrator Too?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb.
21, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://on.wsj.com/xq3cSB.
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perception of judicial fairness is a benefit of open access. 17 Conversely,
critics have pointed out that the Chancery initiative is a step toward a
system "'in which the wealthy get secret justice on a fast track, while
others [receive] messy public processes.' 218 Assuming what these
critics view as inevitable, reason mandates adherence to the same
openness surrounding civil trials.
Additionally, under a broad application of the logic prong, public
access enables shareholders of public corporations to be informed of
corporate activities that could affect stock prices and their rights as
shareholders. 219 A lack of access therefore further removes shareholders
from control of their investments. Keeping in mind the important
corporate cases that fill the Chancery Court's docket, in conjunction with
the one million dollar eligibility requirement, the secrecy of Chancery
arbitrations heightens the risks associated with investment. As one
commentator cautioned, "the Delaware arbitration provisions had the
potential to lock shareholders out of many claims as companies shifted
these claims to arbitration in order to keep them confidential and stop
shareholder class action lawsuits. 22 ° If Delaware's experiment was
permitted to continue, the anticipated increase in corporate claims
addressed behind closed doors would, at least superficially, satisfy the
logic prong of the Richmond Newspapers test. 21
On the other hand, to correctly apply the logic prong of the
Richmond Newspapers test, a court must determine whether public
access fosters the proper "'functioning of the particular process in
question.' ' 222 Emphasis here is rightfully assigned to the specific
procedures at hand.223 Considering that confidentiality is a basic tenet of
arbitration, to expose Chancery arbitration to the public and press would
extinguish any hope for the program's future success. Corporations

217. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984).
218. Palazzolo, supranote 216.
219. For example, arbitrating disputes relating to purposed mergers or asset sales may
leave shareholders in the dark until a time when the board of directors decides to relay
such information, if it even does. Thus, the legal details of corporate decision-making
may never become known if the controversy is remedied through arbitration of the
matter.
220. Davidoff, supra note 1.
221. Hals, supra note 206. "'In five years, we could see substantial growth in the
number of these cases,['] said Gregory Varallo, of Richards, Layton & Finger in
Wilmington, 'It could even rival the number of public business cases."' Id.
222. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Press-Enter.II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
223. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an
enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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would have every incentive to take their chances elsewhere and forego
the advantages offered by a chancellor's award.224 The probative force
of the logic prong, when focused narrowly on arbitration, demands
adherence to the traditional privacy associated with private dispute
resolution.
Courts in the past, including the Third Circuit, have been willing to
find exception to the presumption of public access. 2 25 Specifically,
courts have applied the experience and logic test to find that deportation
cases 226 and judicial disciplinary hearings 227 do not require the watchful
eye of the public. This demonstrates that a narrow approach to the test is
perhaps more appropriate where the constitutionality of closed
proceedings is at least questionable. The unique nature of arbitration and
the role it plays in contemporary American law seem to justify exclusion
of the public in accordance with the parties' wishes. This opinion may
be at odds with the determination made in Strine, yet is consistent with
the broad aims of the FAA and the amicable sentiment the U.S. Supreme
Court has expressed toward arbitration as a means to alleviate an already
overburdened court system.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is this author's opinion that the district court and the Third Circuit
improperly concluded that the Chancery arbitrations must be open to the
public. Accordingly, the Chancery arbitrations do not violate the First
Amendment. Nonetheless, protection of public and shareholder interests
is still possible under Delaware's current arbitration scheme, even if
basic constitutional rights dictate openness.
One possible solution is to amend Delaware's law to provide for
privileged awards. Privileged awards contain a formal determination
"without reason[ing,] together with a document which does not form part
of the award but which gives, on a confidential basis, an outline of the
reasons for the tribunal's decision." 228 These awards implicitly
recognize the existence of interested third parties by providing some

224. These advantages include, as discussed previously, a ruling that incorporates a
chancellor's vast experience and expertise in corporate law.
225. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 212 (holding that "deportation
hearings [do not] boast a tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond
Newspapers").
226. Id.
227. First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 472 (3d
Cir. 1986) (finding that judicial disciplinary boards "do not have a long history of
openness").
228. LONDON MARITIME ARBITRATORS ASSOCIATION TERMS para. 22(c) (2006),
availableat http://bit.ly/190PY21.
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basis from which future litigants can model their conduct. 229 Adopting
mandatory privileged awards would help soothe the tension between
First Amendment concerns and the need for a functional alternative to
litigation.
Applied here, such awards could be furnished for shareholder
review and would add to the legitimacy of the proceedings from the
public's perspective. Moreover, confidentiality is maintained while
simultaneously permitting beneficial access. This solution encourages
transparency in a process that is not antithetical to it. In this sense,
Delaware is free to tend to the administrative ailments its courts face,
corporations can continue to utilize Chancery arbitrations, and the public
remains informed.
Amendment of Delaware's law to allow for
privileged awards therefore provides a middle ground in the midst of the
battle between these two legal titans.

229.

See id.

